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Abstract. Botnets are organized networks of infected computers that
are used for malicious purposes. An example is Kelihos.B, a botnet of
the Kelihos family used primarily for mining bitcoins, sending spam and
stealing bitcoin wallets. A large part of the Kelihos.B botnet was sink-
holed in early 2012 and since then bots are sending requests to controlled
servers. In this paper, we analyze and characterize the behavior of Keli-
hos.B. Our analysis is based on the log file of the bot request logged at
the sinkhole from March 2012 to early November 2013. We investigate
both the overall characteristics of the botnets, as well as on its evolu-
tion over time since the time of the sinkholing. Our results indicate that,
although this trend is decreasing, there are possibly still newly infected
bots even more than a year from the original sinkholing.
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1 Introduction
Botnets are one of the modern threats to society. A botnet consists of several
malware-infected computers (bots) that are controlled by the owners of the bot-
net. Botnets have for example been used to send spam or to launch distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks [1]. One of such botnets is Kelihos.B, which was
primarily used for mining bitcoins, sending spam and stealing bitcoin wallets [2].
The Kelihos.B botnet was sinkholed on the 21st of March 2012 by security
experts from Kaspersky, CrowdStrike, and SURFnet, among others [2]. Sinkhol-
ing is the operation of re-directing C&C requests to a set of controlled servers
by reverse-engineering the botnet C&C mechanisms. As these controlled servers
will not send any jobs to the bots, the botnet is in practice disrupted [4]. Since
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then, the sinkholing servers have collected large numbers of data from the bots
that are still active, although ineffective.
The goal of this paper is to characterize the Kelihos.B botnet. This char-
acterization will contribute to the better understanding of the evolution over a
period of one year and nine months of a sinkholed botnet (from March 2012 to
November 2013). Our analysis confirms and updates preliminary results on the
Kelihos.B botnet that have been carried on days after the sinkholing [2, 4] or in
occasion of other sinkholing operations [5]. However, the analysis presented in
this paper vastly extends previous results and sheds new light on aspects that
are not considered in literature. First, we analyze the long term behavior of the
hosts contacting the sinkhole, which is only hinted at [5]. Second, we identify
the presence, still today, of newly infected hosts from different the Autonomous
Systems, which indicates that the infection vector for this Botnet is still partially
active. Last, we analyze the temporal behavior of hosts in different continents,
which highlights the presence of a clear day-night pattern and implies a certain
type of infected hosts.
This paper is structured as follow. In the Section 2 we provide background
information about the structure of the botnet and the sinkholing operation. Then
the considered dataset and analysis methodology are described in Section 3. In
Section 4, the analysis results are provided. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
A botnet is a collection of hosts, called bots, which are infected with malicious
software. Bots are typically controlled by one or more Command & Control
servers (C&Cs), which belongs to the owner of the botnet and are used to send
bots tasks they have to execute [1].
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Fig. 1: Botnet architectures
In a classical botnet, as shown in Figure 1a, the C&C server is centralized
and it has knowledge about the addresses of every bot in the botnet. Despite
the simplicity of structuring these botnets, a central C&C server is also a single
point of failure, since only the central server has to be disabled to shutdown
the botnet. Recently, botnets based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) infrastructure have
become more common. Examples are the Zeus (P2P variant) [6], Sality [7] and
Kelihos.B, the botnet considered in this paper. An exemplified architecture of a
P2P botnets is shown in Figure 1b. In these botnets, the bots themselves will
propagate C&C instructions, and the presence of a centralized C&C server is
therefore not needed anymore. When a host is infected and becomes a bot, it
will contact a hit-list of trusted hosts from which to request further information
and instructions. This process is called bootstrapping.
Kelihos.B is not the first version of the Kelihos botnet to be sinkholed. The
first Kelihos botnet (or Hlux) was shutdown by a sinkhole operation in Septem-
ber 2011 [8]. The Kelihos family consisted of three types of bots: controllers,
routers and workers, indicated in Figure 1b. The controllers are the bots that
are operated by the owners of the botnet and where the instructions originate.
The router bots have a list of other bots in the network and their goal is to
redistribute the instructions they receive from the controllers. Finally the work-
ers are the bots that execute these instructions. Bots that are located behind
firewalls or NATs and therefore cannot be reached from outside are always put
themselves in worker mode. Examples of possible instructions these workers can
execute include sending spam, participating in distributed denial of service at-
tacks and updating itself to a newer version. These instructions are called jobs.
When a bot wants to obtain new instructions it sends a job request to a set
of predefined routers. When the bot wants to obtain an update of the list of
other bots in the network, it sends a bootstrap request to exchange their lists of
routers. Bots that are new in the network always contain a list of several router
bots to obtain more router addresses from.
Kelihos.B, a new slightly altered version of Kelihos, was discovered merely
weeks after the first sinkholing. Kelihos.B had mostly the same functionality as
the original Kelihos botnet. However the botnets also showed some differences,
such as: the use of encrypted communication protocol and a new set of en-
crypted keys. In addition, according [9] and [2], Kelihos.B was used for different
purposes, such as to intercept passwords, stealing bitcoin wallets, sending spam
and performing DDoS attacks. The family of Kelihos botnets targets Windows-
based hosts and it mainly spread via social networks, in particular via a so-called
Facebook worm that allures users to download a photo album [10]. At the time
of writing this paper it is known that Kelihos has mutated again into a new ver-
sion that shows the additional feature of stealing Internet browsers passwords
[11, 12] and was sinkholed in 2013.
In Section 3 the dataset of the sinkholed Kelihos.B botnet is described.
3 Dataset and Analysis Methodology
The dataset consists of log files from the controlled sinkholing server from the
National Research and Education Network of the Netherlands, SURFnet. The
log files contain a record for each request to the server done by a bot. Figure 2 is
an example of what those records look like. As can be seen each request is logged
together with a human readable timestamp of when the request was received,
followed by whether it was a bootstrap request or a job request, from which IP-
address and port the request originated. Furthermore, job requests also contain
the version of the bot from which the request originates and the operating system
of the infected host.
[2012-03-21 17:40:27.48661] bootstrap request from x.x.x.x:3810
[2012-03-21 17:40:27.58262] job request from y.y.y.y:2924 - 376ae8[...],
v126 "plus001", os info: 5.1.2600, platform 2
Fig. 2: Examples of log entries (IP-addresses are anonymized)
The dataset spans over a period of one year and nine months, from March 21,
2012 until November 7, 2013. In total, the dataset contains almost 594 million
of requests. Therefore this data first had to be aggregated and structured such
that it would be easier to analyze.
The logs have been augmented with additional information, such as geoloca-
tion data as the originating country and continent of the request, and routing
data, i.e., the originating autonomous system. For determining the country from
which the IP-addresses originate the MaxMind [13] database was used. In this
database the country in which IP-addresses are located can be found. Then, for
determining in what continent the country was located the incf.countryutils [14]
module was used. This contains a list of which countries are in which continents.
For determining the autonomous systems the PyASN module [15] was used. This
module uses BGP RIB data from the first of January 2013 to determine which
autonomous system an IP-address is in.
The augmented dataset allows us to investigate the following characteristics:
– Types of requests (bootstrap or job);
– IP-addresses and the information derived from those, such as Autonomous
System numbers and Geo-location information;
– Port numbers;
– Operating systems (for job requests);
– Bot versions (for job requests);
Our analysis methodology is structured along two main aspects. First, we
analyze the dataset as a whole, therefore presenting an overall analysis of the
main data characteristics (Sec. 4.1). Second, we show a temporal analysis of
the data, in which we highlight how the sinkholed botnet is evolving over time
(Sec. 4.2).
4 Analysis Results
This section presents the outcome of our analysis. First, we present the overall
characterization of the Keilhos.B network in Section 4.1; then, in Section 4.2,
we proceed to describe how the botnet has evolved over time in the considered
period.
4.1 Overall analysis
The dataset shows that in total 3.7M unique IP-addresses have contacted the
sinkhole with 593.4 M requests. Of those, 81.5% were bootstrap requests and
18.5% were job requests. This seems to indicate that the maintenance of the
botnet infrastructure, achieved by acquiring bootstrap information, is prevalent
comparing with requests for new jobs. This behavior is also ensuring that the
botnet, once sinkholed, is continuously controlled, even if new hosts will be
infected and became part of the botnet. However, we are not able to quantify
if the sinkholing operation has in a way altered the bot behavior, for example
causing a larger number of bootstrap requests.
The analysis of the geographical characteristic of the hosts contacting the
sinkhole shows that a large fraction of the infected population was located in
Poland. This holds both if we consider the percentage of requests received by the
sinkhole (Table 1a), as well as the percentage of involved IP addresses (Table 1b).
However, Table 1a and Table 1b also indicate that, although several countries
appear in the top 10 countries in both the percentage of sent request as well as
the percentage of involved IP addresses, there is not a direct correlation between
the two lists. Examples are given by the United States, which generate 6.97% of
the requests (41.3 M requests), but only hosts 2.24% of the IP addresses (83K IP
addresses); or Hungary, which generated 3.66% of the requests (21M requests),
but does not appear in the top 10 most active countries in term of IP addresses.
Country Request[%]
Poland 34.13%
United States 6.97%
Turkey 6.85%
Hungary 3.66%
Mexico 3.38%
Argentina 3.24%
Spain 3.06%
Romania 3.04%
Bulgaria 2.22%
Vietnam 2.02%
Others 31.13%
(a) Requests per country
Country IP[%]
Poland 24.85%
Turkey 11.08%
Thailand 4.76%
India 4.74%
Mexico 4.50%
Egypt 4.04%
Vietnam 3.98%
Pakistan 3.56%
Argentina 2.48%
United States 2.24%
Others 33.75%
(b) IPs per country
Table 1: Geographical distribution of request and IP addresses
To better understand how many requests each IP address performs towards
the sinkhole, Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution function of the num-
ber of requests per IP address. From the figure, we derive that 17% of the IP
AS Name Requests (%)
5617 TPNET Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. 7.28%
9121 TTNET Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi 5.09%
6830 LGI-UPC Liberty Global Operations B.V. 3.78%
29314 VECTRANET-AS VECTRA S.A. 3.23%
21021 MULTIMEDIA-AS Multimedia Polska S.A. 3.20%
12741 INTERNETIA-AS Netia SA 2.50%
7922 COMCAST-7922 - Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. 2.00%
8151 Uninet S.A. de C.V. 1.91%
8048 CANTV Servicios, Venezuela 1.61%
10481 Prima S.A. 1.36%
Others 68.03%
Table 2: Top 10 of Autonomous Systems in percentage of requests
addresses (0.63M IP addresses) have only sent a single request to the server. In
addition, 90% of the IP addresses (3.3M) appear up to 135 times in the logs.
The remaining 10% of the distribution shows a long tail, where a handful of IP
addresses are responsible for up to 2M requests. The most active IP address is
located in Montenegro and it created 0.35% of all the requests in the dataset
(2M requests).
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Fig. 3: Cumulative distribution function of the number of requests per IP-
addresses
The total number of unique Autonomous Systems (AS) in the dataset is
7629. Also considering ASes, it is easy to see that Poland dominates the top 10
list of most active ASes in terms of requests. As Table 2 shows, the AS where
most requests originate from is AS5617 (TPNET Telekomunikacja Polska S.A.),
with a share of 7.3% requests (43.3M requests). With a share of 5.1% (30.2 M
requests), the second largest origin of requests is the AS9121 from Turkey.
Version Requests [%]
121 1.47
122 1.12
125 22.65
126 72.93
Other 1.83
(a) Bot version
Operating System Requests [%]
Windows XP + Windows Server 2003 87,73%
Windows Vista + Windows Server 2008 2,10%
Windows 7 + Windows Server 2008 R2 10,17%
(b) Operating Systems
Table 3: Bot information
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the source ports from
which the requests originate. The ports that are by far used most are in the
range 1024 – 5000, used in 70% of the requests. In only less than 1% of the
requests, the bots used to communicate a port in the restricted range (smaller
than 1024). The ports in the ranges 5000 – 50000 and larger than 50000 are both
equally used in are used in 15% of the requests.
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Fig. 4: Cumulative distribution function of originating ports of requests
The two most occurring bot versions are the version 126 with 72.9% and the
version 125 with 22.7%. All the other versions combined have a share of less
than 5%. This can be seen in Table 3a. As will be seen in the next section these
percentages remain close to this values over time.
Finally, our analysis indicates that all requests originate from computers
running the Windows operating system. As can be seen in Table 3b almost 88%
of the job requests originate from computers running Windows XP (or Windows
Server 2003), while the other infected hosts run other operating systems in the
Windows family.
4.2 Temporal analysis
In Figure 5 we show the time series of the number of requests per hour received
by the sinkhole. The figure shows ranges where data are missing, due to some
corrupted logs in the dataset. The overall trend indicated by Figure 5 is an
almost exponential decrease in the number of requests per hour, with a more
stable tendency towards the last months of this measurement. In November 2013,
the sinkhole received between 3000 and 12000 request per hour.
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Fig. 5: Total number of requests and IP addresses per hour
Similarly, Figure 6 shows the amount of new IPs per hour over the dataset.
If we exclude the initial phase, where the faster decrease is due to the beginning
of our measurement period, Figure 6 indicates that the number of new IPs
contacting the sinkhole decreases almost exponentially. For example, from the
first week of January 2013 to the first week of November 2013, the number of
new IP addresses per day decreases from an average of 123 to an average of
48. The number of new IP addresses can indicate both the presence of newly
infected hosts, as well as old infections that may belong to networks with dynamic
IP allocation (DHCP). In Table 4 we show the number of new Autonomous
Systems that appear in the dataset, grouped per quarters. Please note that the
first quarter of 2012 only covers the days from the 21st of March to the 31st
of March, and the last quarter of 2013 covers the first of October to the 7th
of November. Table 4 clearly indicates, for the all duration of the considered
dataset, IPs belonging to new ASes have progressively contacted the sinkhole,
therefore supporting the theory that the Kelihos.B botnet is still evolving.
As shown in Figure 7 three periods can be identified in which the distribution
of job requests is around the same percentage. From the 21st of March until the
29th of June 2012 this average percentage is 13.7%, while from the 20th of
December 2012 this average percentage is 32.0%. In the period between the 29th
Year Quarter Number of new ASes
2012 1* 4628
2012 2 2805
2012 3 5
2012 4 62
2013 1 69
2013 2 33
2013 3 21
2013 4* 6
Table 4: Number of new autonomous systems per quarter of the year
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Fig. 6: Number of new IP-addresses per hour over time
of June 2012 and the 20th of December 2012 there are some gaps due to the
earlier described corrupted data. Except for those gaps there is a remarkably
high average percentage of job requests of 64.1%.
In Figure 8 we have investigated the possible relationship between the re-
quests and the continent where they originate. Figure 8a presents the average
number of requests per hour for the continent of origin of a request, normalized
by the average number of requests per continents. Similarly, Figure 8b shows
the average number of IP-addresses per hour per continent. The normalization
allows a direct comparison of the temporal trend of the requests and IP address
per hour between different continents. A value of 100% indicates a number of
requests or IP addresses equal to the average number. The times in the figures
correspond to the times in the dataset as described in Section 3. Although a
partition of the dataset in continents is only a simplification of approximating
time zones, the results in Figure 8 already indicates that each continent shows
a clear day/night pattern. This seems to suggest that the population of infected
hosts in the dataset is biased towards laptop and workstations. This observation
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Fig. 7: Percentage of job requests per hour
is also supported by the fact that 87.2% of the infected hosts run Windows XP,
as shown in Table 3b.
Finally, we have investigated the distribution of the bot version and the
operative system of the infected hosts over time. In Figure 9 the development of
the version distribution can be seen. All versions follow the exponential decrease
of the total number of requests. Interestingly enough, all versions were already
present at the time of the sinkholing, and they are persistent over the entire
dataset. Also, they percentage with respect to the number of request per hour
tends to remain stable. The only notable exceptions are versions 126 and 128,
which seem to fade faster just after the sinkholing.
There is no significant change in the distribution of operating systems over
time. However, there seems to be a small increase in the share of operating
systems running Windows XP. This can be seen in Figure 10.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the peer-to-peer botnet Kelihos.B. The botnet
was sinkholed in early 2012. Using the requests to the sinkholing server we were
able to determine what the characteristics of this botnet are. This was accom-
plished by first analyzing the overall behavior of the botnet in a time-independent
fashion and then analyzing the behavior over time to obtain knowledge about
how the botnet evolved over time.
In overall, most requests and IP-addresses originate from Poland, although
the distribution of IP addresses per country indicate that there is not a one-
to-one match between the number of requests and the number of active IP ad-
dresses. A telling example is the United States, which is the second most active
country per number of requests, but rank only in 10th position per number of
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Fig. 8: Geographical request and host distribution per hour of day
active hosts. Overall, 90% of the other IP-addresses have sent less than 135 re-
quests, but the distribution of the number of requests per IP address has a long
tail, and a single IP address, located in Montenegro, was able to generate more
than 2M requests. Furthermore the AS5617 TPNET Telekomunikacja Polska
S.A., which is located in Poland, is the autonomous system from which most
requests originate. Finally most bots run version 126 of the botnet software and
most bots run on Windows XP.
With respect to the temporal botnet behavior, we can see that the number
of requests shows a decreasing trend, although it recently tends to stabilize. On
the other hand, the number of new IP addresses contacting the sinkhole seems to
constantly decrease over time. The analysis of the requests per continent shows
that hosts in different continent follows a day-night pattern. Combined with the
observations relative to the operative system of the bots, we can confirm that Ke-
lihos.B primarily targeted personal computer. When considering the distribution
of the bot versions and operating systems, our analysis shows that the distri-
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butions over time remain the same for the duration of the monitoring period.
Also, our results indicate that the bots are still fairly active and the combined
analysis of newly appearing IP addresses from different ASes indicates that the
infection vector is sill active.
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